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SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE. BY Bruce A. Ackerman.
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1980. Pp. xii, 392. $5.95.

The publication of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice 1 in 1971
stands as a milestone in the history of liberal political philosophy.
Social Justice in the Liberal State, by Bruce Ackerman, is the latest
attempt to rival Rawls's contribution to liberalism. Employing the
Socratic conception of political dialogue, this approachable book espouses political programs typical of left-of-center "liberal"2 politics
as practiced in modem America.
Ackerman characterizes political theory as a dialogic process
where individuals critically evaluate each other's assertions of
power.3 As the book progresses, the dialogue becomes a stylistic device in addition to a defining trait of political theory as a cast of
hypothetical characters challenge one another for power. Ackerman
places three restrictions on the characters' quest for political principles. The first two dialogic constraints, the requirements of "rationality"4 and "consistency," 5 are uncontroversial; indeed, they furnish
the basis for any meaningful dialogue in Western thought. The CO)?.·
straint that Ackerman labels "neutrality"6 is more provocative. The
very foundation of liberal political theory,7 this principle holds that
no citizen may defend his power by asserting that his conception of
the good is intrinsically better than those of his fellow citizens. Ackerman devotes the bulk of his book to developing the concrete political positions that follow from the neutrality principle. He divides
this effort into two parts, sketching the features of both utopian and
real-world liberal positions.
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE {1971).
2. The philosopher's "liberalism" may be quite unrelated to what bears that name in the
political arena. In this sentence, "liberal" is meant in its second sense.
3. Power is used here in its broadest sense. It includes not only the power of political
office, but also the power to own property, to operate an automobile, to eat when one is hungry; in short, the power to do anything that humans can do.
4. "Rationality: Whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of another's power, the
power holder must respond not by suppressing the questioner but by giving a reason that
explains why he is more entitled to the resource than the questioner is." P. 4.
5. "Consistency. The reason advanced by a power wielder on one occasion must not be
inconsistent with the reasons he advances to justify his other claims to power." P. 7.
6. Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert:
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens,
or
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or
more of his fellow citizens.
P. 11. The second element - that no citizen may assert his intrinsic superiority to any other
citizen - seelllS to be a corollary of the first - that no one may assert an intrinsically superior
conception of the good.
7. See Three Concepts ef Liberalism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1979, at 45, 47 (dialogue between Bryan Magee and Ronald Dworkin).
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Social Justice first examines basic political principles in a fantastic setting uncomplicated by the scarce resources and imperfections
of the real world. The fantasy involves members of a spaceship crew
who debate how to structure a new world. The new world has only
one resource, "manna," that can be converted into any of the more
tangible resources that people use. The characters accept the three
dialogic constraints of liberalism and rely on a Solomonic Commander to interpret and enforce those constraints. The most basic
conclusion to emerge from the spaceship dialogue asserts that manna
must be distributed equally. Because no party may assert a superior
conception of the good, the crew reasons that each person has an
equal claim to manna.
Ackerman next considers several issues related to future generations. Regarding intergenerational trusteeship and inheritance, he
argues for both intergenerational and intragenerational equality.
Each member of a new generation must begin with an equal share of
manna, and the share must be at least as large as the initial share
given to each member of the preceding generation. Social Justice
also addresses popularly disputed issues such as contraception, abortion, and genetic manipulation, resolving them all in fashionably liberal ways. 8 Liberal education receives substantial treatment.
Ackerman claims that education too often seeks to mold children
into the mirror images of their parents. He believes that education
should expose students to as many ideas as possible, so long as those
ideas are not, like Nazism, antithetical to the neutrality principle. As
the budding citizen develops a respect for the multiplicity of
thoughts and values of others, parental and other educational restrictions gradually may be lifted so that he may become a full-fl.edged
citizen of the liberal state.
All in all, Ackerman paints a rosy picture of the liberal utopia.
This enviable world allows free intellectual exchange and also perfectly screens all the activities of some individuals from others who
do not wish to be affected. I may, if I choose, smell my neighbor's
barbecue (unless he chooses to screen it from me), but I need not
smell his car's exhaust fumes.
The second step in the development of the liberal program is
Ackerman's most difficult. Social Justice resorts to a "second-best"
argument, and attempts to apply the principles developed in the
spaceship fantasy to the real world. In the real world, the technology
that enforces liberal ideals is neither perfect nor free. Ackerman admits that statesmen may legitimately disagree about how the liberal
state can best promote self-fulfillment in a world of scarcity. Liberal
citizens can justifiably use a variety of procedures to resolve their
8. Contraception: "a fundamental right of all citizens." P. 126. Abortion: allowed in most
situations, but not, e.g., because the parents are unhappy with the fetus's sex or eye color. Pp.
127-28. Genetic manipulation: not allowed. Pp. 120-24.
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good faith disagreements. Majority rule, for instance, satisfies the
neutrality principle because it does not purport to recommend one
political view as intrinsically superior to another. Ackerman nevertheless concedes that a good lottery meets the same requirements of
a "neutral" decision-making process.
Ackerman is careful to exclude from the political arena only exploitative policy choices, those that harm a particular group of citizens. He realizes that the problem of exploitation is not magically
self-solving. Controls are needed in the real world to preserve the
very possibility of liberal dialogue. 9 Here, Social Justice becomes
vulnerable to criticism. The book fails to address how the liberal
polity decides where controls may legitimately be imposed - where
statements or activities are so insufficiently neutral that they must be
prohibited. In the dialogues, all the characters accept the Commander's judgments regarding neutrality. In real life, however, the
meaning of neutral principles is not so transparent. Because no litmus test exists to determine whether given statements or activities
adhere to the neutrality principle, one expects that citizens will have
good faith disagreements. 10
A more general shortcoming flaws Ackerman's attempt to apply
fantasy-derived principles to the real world. The hardest and most
important choices that liberals must confront are the ones given the
shortest treatment. How, one might ask, can resources be allocated
for future generations when the number and preferences of those
generations cannot be known with perfect prescience? Similarly,
how should resources be allocated when distributional flaws render
truly equal distribution impossible, or when all may starve because
the equal distribution is too small? Unfortunately, Ackerman provides little guidance on these troubling issues.
In the book's final part, Ackerman attempts to justify liberalism's
foundational principle of neutrality. He first criticizes Rawls's justice-as-fairness and utilitarian theories for simply assuming their first
principles. According to Ackerman, Rawls's theory ultimately depends on unquestioned "intuitions" that, in fact, might mask cultural
biases. And the utilitarian, he maintains, presupposes that his own
pleasure does not generate a moral claim superior to that presented
by the pleasure of others, a stance that Ackerman finds anti-individualistic. In contrast to its two competitors, Ackerman's dialoguebased theory purports to take nothing for granted. The author
suggests that four independent justifications exist for the neutrality
principle and, hence, for the liberal state: "realism about the cor9. These are classified as input controls, e.g., banning authoritarians from government office; process controls, e.g., a system of checks and balances; and output controls, e.g., a bill of
rights.
10. This seems especially true since Ackerman's citizens, unlike those behind Rawls's veil
of ignorance, must make decisions with full awareness of their earthly vested interests.
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rosiveness of power; recognition of doubt as a necessary step to
moral knowledge; respect for the autonomy of persons; and skepticism concerning the reality of transcendent meaning" (p. 369).
Social Justice, however, says little about the reasonableness of
these "four . . . main highways to the liberal state" (p. 369). These
principles clearly stand in need of justification: The autonomy of
persons and moral skepticism, for instance, are not universally accepted propositions in our own culture, let alone the rest of the
world. Since Ackerman has distanced himself from metaphysics, intuitionism, and "pure reason," it is not clear how he can finally support the neutrality principle. Ultimately, Ackerman's state may
depend on an unexamined acceptance of liberal principles, and Social Justice may not be exempt from the criticisms that it registers
against Rawls and the utilitarians.
On one level, Social Justice succeeds in bringing a coherent
framework to the disparate policies advocated by modem liberals.
Stylistically, the dialogues, while at times sounding like stilted expressions of the philosopher's preconceived outcomes, make Ackerman's effort more accessible than much political philosophy. On a
more basic level, however, Ackerman ultimately ignores the earthly
reality that liberal democracy - or any political system - is a
means that men use to attain deeply felt substantive beliefs rather
than an end in itself. By divorcing the political system from substantive goals, Ackerman offers a possibly unique creature: an end-less
means. Its uniqueness, though, does not guarantee its rightness.
"An open mind is a great idea," wrote journalist Heywood Broun,
"but if you make it your primary aim in life, what you'll end up with
will more resemble a cave of winds." 11

11. Quoted in P. SEEGER, THE INCOMPLEAT FOLKSINGER 3 (1972).
Social JI/Stice in the Liberal State is also reviewed by Wolfe, Liberal Foundationsfor Liber•
alism?, 1981 PuB. INT.125; Walzer, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1980, at 39; Orwin,
As Good As You, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 7 (Book Review), at 14.

